This paper shows empirically that the positive association between mutual fund ownership and firm value in China is mainly driven by the informed trading of mutual funds. Utilizing the unique short term feature of mutual fund holdings for the period from 2001 to 2010, we provide an informational link between a decomposed component of market-to-book ratio (firm specific valuation component) and mutual fund holdings. Specifically, we find that firms with a higher level of mutual fund ownership are associated with a higher specific value. Moreover, the positive association between the specific value of a firm and mutual fund ownership is more pronounced in firms with a higher level of specific information (or higher idiosyncratic volatility). We argue that in an emerging market such as China, mutual funds help to improve market efficiency by incorporating private information into stock prices through their informed trading although they are really a lack of incentive to monitor management.
Introduction
It has been widely recognized in the literature that institutional ownership is positively associated with stock prices or firm value (Gompers and Metrick 2001; Ferreira, and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, and Matos, 2011; among others) . One strand of the studies contributes this positive association to a monitoring role (monitoring hypothesis) played by institutional investors who influence executive compensation structures (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) , while the other strand of studies argues that the presence of institutional investors enhances the informativeness of stock prices (informational hypothesis) by incorporating their private information through trading activities (Sias, Starks, and Titman, 2006; Ferreira and Lux 2007) . However, to empirically differentiate the monitoring effect of institutional ownership on stock performance from the informational effect is challenging.
Recently Yan and Zhang (2009) further document that short term institutional investors (with a high portfolio turnover rate) have clear informational advantage over long term institutions (with a low portfolio turnover rate). They find that the positive relationship between mutual fund ownership and future stock returns documented by Gompers and Metrick (2001) is driven by short term institutions. Nevertheless, there is still no direct evidence on: How the informative trading of short term institutions affects firm performance, in other words, what is the channel through which the presence of short term institutions enhances firm performance? How can the monitoring effect of institutional ownership on stock performance be isolated from the informational effect? Furthermore, using the stock portfolio turnover rate of an institution as a proxy for its duration of ownership in previous studies (e.g. Yan and Zhang 2009) is not without controversy because the high portfolio turnover rate of an institutional holder does not necessarily mean it holds stocks for a short term. This paper investigates how mutual fund ownership is associated with firm specific valuation and how mutual funds help the incorporation of firm specific information into firm value by utilizing a unique institutional feature in the Chinese stock market, the short termism of mutual fund holding.
China's stock markets have been dominated by individual investors and short term institutions since they were established in the 1990s, and this unique feature has not been changed, even after the introduction of large institutional investors through the establishment of closed and open-end mutual funds in 2001. For big institutional investors in China such as mutual funds, QFIIs, and Social Security funds, the holding duration of over 60% of their investments is less than 3 months, and only around 5% of the holdings are longer than 12 months (China Capital Markets Development Report, 2008) 4 . Given this extremely short investment horizon, it is very hard for the mutual funds in China to have sufficient incentives to monitor the management of their holding firms. However, this short termism feature of mutual fund holding provides us with a unique environment for testing the economic effect of mutual fund ownership on firm performance or firm value, and it also allows us to distinguish the monitoring hypothesis from the informational hypothesis for the economic association between mutual fund ownership and firm value in China. In addition, investors will face strict requirements for disclosure from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC) once their holding shares have reached the 5% threshold of a listed firm. It is rare for mutual funds to hold more than 5% of stocks of a particular listed firm whereas it is common for an 4 According to Figure 3.23 in China Capital Markets Development Report (2008) , the average turnover ratio (927% in Shanghai Stock Exchange and 987% in Shenzhen Stock Exchange) in Chinese stock markets is seven times higher than that (around 129%, refer to the text for details) in the U.S. markets. Huang, Sialm and Zhang (2011) report an average turnover ratio of 89.52% for the mutual funds in the U.S. over the period between 1980 and 2009 . Tang, Wang and Xu (2012 report an average fund turnover rate of 316.71% between 2004 and 2010. Even in the top quintile of their sample, the average turnover of 186.35%, around twice of that in the U.S. institutional investor in the U.S. to hold more than 5% of a firm's stock. For example, from 41% to 73% of the firms sampled by Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) have at least one institutional block holder (holding 5% or above). This holding preference by Chinese mutual funds will further discourage them from implementing a monitory role. We argue that the positive association between firm value and mutual fund ownership is more likely to be explained by the informational hypothesis rather than the monitoring hypothesis, since mutual funds can simply gather and trade on their clear informational advantage and expertise over individual investors.
Using mutual fund ownership data from 2001 to 2010, we first confirm that mutual fund ownership is positively and statistically associated with both firm value (proxies by market-to-book ratio) and firm operating performance. However, it is possible that mutual fund holding could indirectly affect firm value through its influence on the firms' operations.
In other words, we cannot rule out the possibility that mutual funds sell their stocks rather than exert any effort to influence management, even if they do not have sufficient incentive to directly monitor management due to a short holding horizon and a small stake in the firms.
Furthermore, firm value and firm operating performance are correlated because firm value reflects both the current and future information of a firm, but the operating performance is correlated more with the firm's current information. To successfully test whether the valuation link from mutual fund ownership to informed trading and firm value exists, it is necessary to isolate the valuation component that is driven by operating performance from the component that is correlated with firm specific information.
Following a decomposition methodology developed in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005) and advocated by Hertzel and Li (2010) , we decompose firm value (MTB ratios) into a component related to operating performance (LRVTB), a component of misevaluation or firm specific error (FSE) and a growth option component (TSSE) . We find that all three valuation components are positively and statistically associated with mutual fund ownership. A regression on the firm specific component (FSE) has the largest coefficients on mutual ownership, which strongly supports our proposed association between firm specific value and fund ownership. We then test the interaction between mutual fund ownership and firm specific information (idiosyncratic volatility) and how the interaction affects firm specific error (FSE). The empirical evidence confirms our informational hypothesis that mutual fund ownership is positively associated with firm specific valuation component by an increase in the informativeness of stock prices or idiosyncratic volatility. And the positive association between firm value and mutual fund ownership is likely due to informed trading and price discovery by mutual funds in China.
To alleviate any concerns about the robustness of our findings, we use alternative measures for mutual fund holdings, a change-in-change approach, and a quasi-natural experiment to verify the results. We first use an alternative measure for informed trading by mutual funds as advocated in Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) , and a change in the number of mutual funds holding a stock to replace the fraction of holding measure. We then run a change-in-change approach and regress changes in firm specific value on changes in mutual fund holdings to address any concerns of endogeneity caused by reverse causality. Last, we use a quasi-natural experimental approach to see how the association between firm specific value, and idiosyncratic volatility and mutual ownership responds to the Split Share Structure Reform that happened in China from 2005 to 2007. We find that our informational argument is robust to the alternative holding measure, the alternative empirical approach, and the quasiexogenous event.
Our paper complements the mutual fund ownership literature in the following two ways. First, we use the short term holding pattern widely observed in the Chinese mutual fund industry to disentangle the informational hypothesis from the monitoring hypothesis for the economic effect of mutual fund ownership on firm value. Our empirical evidence suggests that in an emerging market such as China, mutual funds might lack incentives to monitor management, but they could help to improve market efficiency by incorporating private information into stock prices through their informed trading. Second, we provide a valuation channel for mutual fund ownership to be associated with firm value through its positive association with idiosyncratic volatility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable hypotheses and presents the decomposition methodology of market-to-book ratios. Section 3 describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 4 examines the association between mutual fund ownership and firm value, and how ownership interacts with idiosyncratic volatility to affect the firm specific value component. Section 5 investigates the robustness of our main findings, and section 6 concludes.
Development of Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
This section presents our testable hypotheses and empirical methodology. We first elaborate on the background of the development of mutual funds in China, followed by discussions on how the ownership of mutual funds impacts on firm operating performance and value. We then discuss how to isolate the indirect impact that mutual funds have on firm performance from that of informed trading by decomposing the market-to-book ratios, and finally, we investigate the correlation between mutual fund ownership and firm idiosyncratic volatility.
Mutual funds in China
China's mutual fund market has been growing rapidly since the first open-end mutual fund was established in 2001. According to a recent article published in the China Securities Journal, 5 China's mutual fund market at the end of 2011 totalled USD339 billion in net assets, while the net fund assets were only USD 10 billion in 2001, an annualized growth rate of 142%. However, the mutual fund market is small in size relative to both the aggregate level of GPD and the total stock market capitalization of China. China's total value of mutual fund investment only accounts for about 4.65% of its GDP, and the securities investment funds (around 74.45% of mutual funds investment, Shanghai Stock Exchange Factbook 2012) only account for 7.8% of total market capitalization compared to 40.03% and 25.67% in Brazil, and 76.99% and 40.28% in the U.S., respectively. With more than 30 years of development, investors in Chinese stock markets are still dominated by small and medium sized individual investors (51.3% of market share, China Capital Markets Development Report, 2008).
Despite the rapid development of institutional investors over the past decade, China's stock markets are still characterized by short term investment, a high turnover rate, and a lack of monitoring management by shareholders, even for big institutional investors such as mutual funds, QFIIs, and Social Security funds, etc. It is very difficult for mutual funds in China to have sufficient incentives to monitor the management of their holding stocks given their extremely short investment horizon and high turnover ratio. Table 1 is a distribution   table for mutual fund ownership of our sample firms from 2001 to 2010. For individual mutual funds, less than 1% of the holding falls into the 5% holding requirement. By assuming that a mutual fund under the same management company could have collective actions on an individual firm, we also group ownership by fund management companies. Only slightly more than 1% of the holdings satisfy the 5% holding requirement. The percentage of firms that satisfy both criteria is 1.21%.
[Please insert Table 1 here] A recent study by Chen, Harford, and Li (2007) argue that only independent long term institutions with sufficiently large holdings (more than 5%) can benefit from their efforts as monitors and be able to share the superior post-merger performance of their monitored firms with other investors. Short term institutional investors may choose to trade on a firm's specific information rather than monitor the firm. Yan and Zhang (2009) also find that only the ownership of institutional investors with high portfolio turnover rate is positively associated with future stock returns and future earnings surprises because they are more likely to be better informed than their low portfolio turnover rate counterparts. In order to distinguish the informational argument from the monitoring argument, we need the institutional investors to satisfy two criteria, holding a large state in stocks (more than 5%) and holding for a long period (over 12 months). It is clear that mutual funds in China are short term institutional investors because most of them do not meet the two criteria for long term investors.
Mutual fund ownership and firm performance
A recent study by Yuan et al. (2008) finds that mutual fund ownership in China is positively associated with both firm operating performance and firm value. 
where α and δ are firm fixed effects and time fixed effects, respectively. Market-to-book ratio (MTB) is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. This measure of performance reflects a firm's growth opportunities (Fama and French, 1995) . We use industry adjusted natural log transformed MTB as our performance measure. Cornett et al., (2007) argue that the measures of operating performance provide two incentives over measures of the market value. First, an operating performance measure is a more focused measure of current performance, and unlike market performance measure, it is not inflated by price changes associated with the expectative corporate takeover events. Second, operating performance is not tied to share prices and it does rely on a specific model of expected returns, although market performance could be more susceptible to engodeneity problems if financial institutions (e.g., mutual funds) chase recent market winners or growth stocks.
These problems are much more pronounced in emerging stock markets due to frequent price manipulation and poor corporate governance (Wang, 2004) . Return on assets (ROA) is defined as operating income before depreciations and amortizations divided by the book value of total assets. This performance measure is considered to be the most common accounting profitability measure in the literature and is used as a proxy for the profitability of a company's core business (Yuan et al., 2008) . In order to reconcile the results of ROA with that of the operating performance measure net income (NI) used in the decomposition of market-to-book ratio (Section 2.3), we also report the estimation results using NI (net income scaled by book value of equity). Mutual fund ownership (FundHLD) is the percentage of shares owned by mutual funds in the sample firms, computed as the number of shares held by mutual funds divided by the total shares outstanding. Our mutual fund ownership only measures the ownership of funds incorporated in China.
To remain consistent with the existing literature we adopt two sets of control variables: Firm-specific variables include firm size, leverage, asset tangibility, previous 12 month median market turnover, and previous 12 month excess stock returns earnings per share. Definitions of these control variables are presented as follows. Firm size (SIZE) is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of each fiscal year. It has often been argued that size has a negative impact on firm performance (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Leverage (LEV) is a debt-to-asset ratio, computed as the book value of total debts divided by the book value of total assets at the end of each fiscal year. Both Sun and Tong (2003) and Qi et al. (2000) , find that leverage is positively related to the market-to-bookvalue ratio but negatively related to accounting returns in China. Tangibility 
Firm operating performance and decomposition of Market-to-Book ratio
The baseline regressions in Section 2.2 can only investigate whether mutual fund ownership is associated with firm operating performance or with firm value independently. However, it cannot identify the source of a high market-to-book ratio or whether the high market-to-book ratio is driven by an improved operating performance because of an indirect influence by mutual funds on firms' operations through selling their holdings ("voting by feet"), or is driven by informed trading on firm specific information gathered by the mutual funds. Since there are multiple factors driving the increase in MTB, ROA is only representing factors related to current operating performance. It is therefore necessary for us to further explore the value sources of MTB by decomposition and then to understand whether informed trading also contributes to the high MTB ratio.
A lot of previous studies use decomposed components of the MTB ratio to explore the value driving factors behind a high MTB ratio (e. and is intended to capture the extent to which a firm is mis-valued relative to its contemporaneous industry peers (the focus of this study). The TSSE component measures valuation deviations when contemporaneous sector accounting multiples differ from long term sector multiples, hence this component is used to measure whether the sector or the entire market, is overvalued. The LRVTB component measures the value implied by long term sector accounting multiples relative to book value; it is used as a proxy for growth opportunities. Specifically, the three components are estimated using the following model specification:
which includes the natural logarithm of market value of equity (LNMVE), the natural logarithm of book value of equity (LNBVE), the natural logarithm of net income LN(NI), and market leverage (MKTLEV) ratio (book value of debt over market value of equity). Since NI can sometimes be negative, it is expressed as an absolute value (NI)+ along with a dummy variable, I(<0), to indicate when NI is negative. To calculate the contemporaneous accounting multiples α jt each year, we group all sample firms according to the 12 CSRC industry classifications: run annual, cross sectional regressions (of the decomposition equation) for each industry, and then generate estimated industry accounting multiples for each year t. The estimated value of V_hat is the fitted value from regression equation. To calculate the long term sector multiples α j , we average the α jt from the annual regressions over the sample years prior to the ownership event. The estimate of V_bar is then the "fitted" value of the equation using the average α jt . From the regression model V_hat, the predicted value from the regression really captures the value contribution from assets in place, and market leverage and current earnings that are available to equity holders. We then use the following calculations to make FSE free from the influence of current earnings.
LNMTB = LNMVE -LNBVE, is our market-to-book ratio used as firm market performance. FSE = LNMVE -V_hat, is firm specific misevaluation relative to their industry peers. TSSE = V_hat -V_bar, is valuation deviations from industry long-run. LRVTB = V_bar -LNBVE, is growth opportunities, or long-run industry mean relative to book value of equity.
[Please insert Table 2 here] Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients and all the above defined variables calculated from the equations. This estimation is consistent with that reported in Hertzel and Li (2010) using the U.S. sample. The high R 2 indicates that the specification of the decomposition model indeed has sufficiently high explanatory power for the market value of equity. Using the decomposed components of MTB, we test whether mutual fund ownership is positively associated with these three components, in particular firm specific mis-evaluation of FSE.
According to the informational hypothesis, short term mutual funds are likely to trade on firm specific information gathered, rather than do monitoring. Since our sampled mutual funds are unlikely to hold a large state in stocks (more than 5%), and only hold them for a short period (less than 12 months), our second testable hypothesis is:
H2: Mutual fund ownership is positively related to firm specific misevaluation component of value (FSE).

Mutual fund ownership, idiosyncratic volatility, and firm specific valuation
It is well established in the literature that institutional ownership or mutual fund ownership is closely related to information flow, and idiosyncratic volatility in stock returns is a good proxy for information flow (Roll 1988; Durnev et al. 2003) . Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) investigate the association between idiosyncratic volatility and institutional trading, and find that institutional trading activities accelerate the incorporation of the firm specific information of earnings into stock prices. Recent studies by Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) and Ferreira and Lux (2007) all support an information flow link for the association between changes in stock prices and institutional trading. Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) argue that institutional trading has both temporary and permanent price impacts on stocks and these impacts in stock prices are associated with information flow. Ferreira and Lux (2007) find that firms' openness to the market for corporate control encourages informed trading by institutions and is positively associated with the idiosyncratic volatility related to information.
To further explore the information aspects of the effect of valuation on institutional ownership, we first explore the time serial correlation of idiosyncratic volatility and institutional ownership from 2001 to 2010 in China. Table 3 indicates that the average idiosyncratic volatility has a positive association with the average institutional holdings over our sample periods, which is consistent with the empirical evidence documented in the literature.
[Please insert Table 3 here]
Since the firm specific misevaluation component of value (FSE) is related to the flow of firm specific information we should expect there is a positive association between FSE and idiosyncratic volatility, but to consistent with the informational hypothesis, the positive association between FSE and mutual fund ownership should be more pronounced for firms with high idiosyncratic volatility.
H3: Idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to firm specific misevaluation component of value (FSE), and the interaction between mutual fund ownership and idiosyncratic volatility
is positively related to FSE. 
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where FSE is the firm specific misevaluation component of value computed in Section 2.3 and idiosyncratic volatility (IDIO) is defined as the standard deviation of estimated stock return residuals in the previous fiscal year. Specifically, we estimate the CAPM model for each firm-year daily stock returns and compute the standard deviation of estimated residuals from the market asset pricing models. 
Data Sample
Our initial sample contains all the firms from the mutual fund shareholding databases of the . We match the ownership data with stock returns and accounting information for the Chinese A shares available at CSMAR with the following criteria:
1. Firms with missing mutual fund ownership information are excluded.
2.
Firms with missing accounting and stock market information are excluded.
3.
Firms with negative book value of equity are excluded.
4.
Firm-year observations in their first IPO year are excluded.
5.
Firms in finance and insurance industry are excluded (with CSRC Industry
Classification code "I")
The final sample consists of 12,852 firm-year observations. The measurement of 13 industry classifications is issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC).
[Please insert Table 4 here] Table 4 reports the summary statistics of all the key variables that will be used in the Chinese studies, manufacturing firms account for 56% of our sample. [Please insert Table 5 here]
Empirical Results
In this section we test our three hypotheses developed in Section 2. To mitigate the endogeneity present when estimating the association between firm value and mutual fund ownership, we use lagged one year ownership variables as key explanatory variables, although we cannot rule out the possibility of omitted variable bias, or unobserved firm heterogeneity. In this situation, lagged mutual fund ownership and firm value are spuriously correlated and they are both driven by some unobservable firm characteristic(s). We use the firm fixed effect model to mitigate the endogeneity caused by unobservable firm heterogeneity, and also include year dummy variables in our regressions to control for possible time effects. All the variables have been winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles because this approach reduces the impact of extreme observations by assigning cut off value to values beyond the cut-off point. Table 6 presents estimates from the baseline specification (equations (1), (2) and (3) [Please insert Table 6 here]
Mutual fund ownership and firm performance
Mutual fund ownership and the decomposition of MTB
The empirical results of the baseline regressions in Section 4.1 support our first hypothesis that mutual fund ownership is positively correlated with both firm value and firm operating performance. However, these estimations cannot identify whether the increase in firm value associated with fund ownership is driven purely by an increase in operating performance through an increased monitoring role played by mutual funds (the monitoring hypothesis), or by facilitating private information incorporated into stock prices through their informed trading (the informational hypothesis). The market-to-book ratio has been widely used in asset pricing literature as an indicator of a firm's long term prospects. There are multiple factors driving an increase in the firm value proxy (MTB), and the operating performance measure (both ROA and Net Income) only represents the current performance of a firm.
In order to separate the contribution made by current operating performance from those made by other factors, we use a decomposition methodology developed in Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (RKRV) (2005) to further investigate whether mutual fund ownership is associated with all three decomposed components of MTB, as detailed in Section 2.2. Since the firm specific error component of FSE captures firm level mispricing relative to its contemporaneous industry peers, our focus in this section is to see whether mutual fund ownership affects firm value through this mispricing component that is likely to be correlated with firm specific information. Table 7 presents the estimated results for the association between three decomposed components of firm value and mutual fund ownership.
We use the three components estimated in Section 2. [Please insert Table 7 here]
Mutual fund ownership, idiosyncratic volatility and firm specific valuation
In this section we formally test our informational hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) and investigate whether idiosyncratic volatility is associated with firm specific value component FSE, and whether mutual fund ownership and idiosyncratic volatility interacts to affect FSE.
Idiosyncratic volatility is a widely accepted measure for the informativeness of stock prices, or for the flow of firm specific information. As with Gul, Kim and Qiu (2010), we apply the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 9 and regress all past year daily stock returns of our sampled firm on aggregated Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange value-weighted market returns, and extract the residuals from the model estimations. We then compute the annual standard deviation of the residuals for each firm in each year.
[Please insert Table 8 here]
To test the information hypothesis, we first add idiosyncratic volatility as an additional variable into our FSE regressions to see whether firm specific information flow is correlated with the firm specific value component. In Column (2) of Table 8 , the correlation between FSE and idiosyncratic volatility is 0.771. The coefficient on FUNDHLD changes slightly from 0.650 in Column (3) of Table 7 to 0.628. Both the coefficients on FUNDHLD and idiosyncratic volatility are statistically significant at the 1% level, which indicates that the flow of firm specific information and mutual fund ownership act independently on firm value. In other words, mutual fund trading is not the only channel through which firm specific information is incorporated into firm value. When we interact idiosyncratic volatility with mutual fund ownership in Column (3), the coefficient on the interactive term is positive and significant at the 1% level. Both coefficients on FUNDHLD and idiosyncratic volatility decrease slightly but remain highly significant. This evidence supports our argument regarding information flow for mutual fund ownership that informed trading by mutual funds facilitates the incorporation of firm specific information into firm value. In other words, these findings confirm that a link exists between information flowing from mutual fund ownership to firm specific valuation. For a firm with an average idiosyncratic volatility of 0.118 (Table   3) , a 1 percentage point increase in mutual fund holdings is associated with 0.118*0.01*1.749=0.21% increase in firm specific value relative to their industry median, or an increase of 8.4 % of average industry-adjusted FSE (with an average value of 0.025 in our sample).
Robustness checks
Changes in the number of mutual funds
The firm fixed effects model used in Section 4 alleviates the concern for endegeneity caused by unobserved firm heterogeneity, but the model is silent on endogeneity caused by reverse causality. In other words, it is possible for a firm with high value to attract more mutual funds to buy its shares 10 rather than the high ownership by mutual funds improves a firm's valuation. In addition Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) argue that stock prices should be correlated with net fund order flow since the aggregate demand for stocks by mutual funds will push up stock prices when non-fund investors have an upward sloping supply curve. In order to address these two concerns, we use quarterly mutual fund shareholding databases of CSMAR to construct two proxies for informed trading, average annual changes in fund ownership (CHGFUNDHLD) and average annual changes in the number of mutual funds holding a stock (CHGFUNDNUM). The sample size is reduced to 6,269 firm year observations since the holding data of CSMAR is available only after 2003. We also use lagged CHGFUNDHLD and lagged CHGFUNDNUM to further mitigate the reserve causality problem. We then re-estimate Equation (5) and use these two new proxies to replace the level variable (FUNDHLD). Our approach here is essentially change-in-change since the dependent variable FSE, is a component of the natural log transformation of market-to-book ratios. As a comparison, we also report the results of pooled-OLS regressions in the table.
[Please insert Table 9 here] Table 9 presents the results of the association between the firm specific component (FSE) and the two new proxies. Notably, the coefficients on lagged CHGFUNDHLD and lagged CHGFUNDNUM are positive and significant across all four columns. The estimated coefficients for CHGFUNDNUM range from 0.345 to o.698. Table 10 reproduces the results reported in Table 8 using the two new proxies. The coefficients of interest, the interactions between CHGFUNDHLD and CHGFUNDNUM with IDIO are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Taken together, this change-in-change approach alleviates concerns about potential reverse causality and further confirms the information hypothesis that informed trading by mutual funds improves the incorporation of firm specific information into firm specific value.
[Please insert Table 10 here]
Share-split structure reform
To address concerns about reverse causality we also use a quasi-natural experimental approach to see how informational environment and mutual fund holdings respond to the 
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where Post is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has completed its split share structure reform and 0 otherwise. The positive coefficients on the interactions between Post with FUNDHLD and between Post with IDIO indicate improvement in the economic impact of fund holding and informational environment after the reform, respectively. The positive coefficient of the interaction term Post*FUNDHLD*IDIO measures whether mutual funds have more incentives to trade on their informational advantage after the share split structure reform than they do before the reform. Table 11 displays the estimates for the difference-indifference approach in a firm fixed effects model. As expected, both the coefficients on the interactions Post*FUNDHLD and Post*IDIO are positive and significant (in Column (3)).
Surprisingly, the coefficient on Post*FUNDHLD*IDIO is negative and significant (-3.953 with t-statistics of -4.63). However, the interpretation of the coefficient on this triple interaction term also depends the other interactions Post*FUNDHLD and Post*IDIO.
[Please insert Table 11 here]
In order to illustrate the complex effect of interactions reported in Table ( Table 12 displays regression coefficients calculated for these four representatives before and after the reform. Before the reform, increasing fund ownership from Low to High for the Low-idiosyncratic-volatility firms, the firm specific value increases by 0.0263, while increasing fund ownership from Low to High for the High-idiosyncratic-volatility firms, the firm specific value increases by 0.0416. However, after the reform, the firm specific value increases by 0.0537 for the Low-idiosyncratic-volatility firms, an increase of 0.027 due to the reform, indicating both improvements in informational environment and in incentives for mutual funds to trade on their informational advantage. However, for the High-idiosyncraticvolatility firms, the increase is only 0.0022, which is almost negligible. Furthermore, after the reform the incentives for mutual fund trading are reduced for the High-idiosyncratic-volatility firms. This partly explains the negative coefficient on Post*FUNDHLD*IDIO in Table 11 .
We reason that after the reform, non-tradable shares for the High-idiosyncratic-volatility firms now become tradable (untabulated results show that these firms are less likely to be controlled by state government). The controlling shareholders of these firms become informed trader, having informational advantage to mutual funds. That is probably the reason why the mutual funds' information role has been discouraged for this particular group of firms.
[Please insert Table 12 A few recent studies have found that foreign ownership, institutional ownership (especially mutual fund ownership), and high quality auditing, help to mitigate informational impediments and to improve the informativeness of stock prices by encouraging informed trading in China. Our paper complements the literature by providing an information-tovaluation channel through which mutual fund ownership can be associated with firm specific value. 
The model includes the natural logarithm of market value of equity (LNMVE), the natural logarithm of book value of equity (LNBVE), the natural logarithm of net income LN(NI), and market leverage (MKTLEV) ratio. NI is expressed as an absolute value (NI)+ along with a dummy variable, I(<0), to indicate when NI is negative. All the estimated coefficients are reported in Panel A. In Panel B, LNMTB is defined as LNMVE -LNBVE, FSE is defined as LNMVE -V_hat, representing firm specific misevaluation relative to their industry peers, TSSE is equal to V_hat -V_bar, representing valuation deviations from industry long-run, and LRVTBis equal to V_bar -LNBVE, representing growth opportunities, long-run industry mean relative to book value of equity The reported variables are industry-adjusted by subtracting their CSRC industry median. A is Agriculture, forestry and fishery industry, B is Mining industry, C is Manufacturing industry, D is Energy industry, E is Construction industry, F is Transport and storage industry, G is Information Technology industry, H is Wholesale and retail trade industry, J is Real estate industry, K is Social service industry, L is Communication and Cultural Industry and M is Comprehensive industry. LNMTB is the natural logarithm of market value of equity to book value of total equity ratio. ROA is net operating profit/ book value of total assets. FUNDHLD is the percentage of shares owned by mutual funds. SSHLD is the percentage of shares owned by social security funds. QFIIHLD is the percentage of shares owned by QFIIs. STATEHLD is the percentage of shares owned by state government and if state government is the controlling shareholder in the listed firm. HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Table 5 Correlation matrix   This table reports correlation table of the data sample for the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] . LNMTB is the natural logarithm of market value of equity to book value of total equity ratio. ROA is net operating profit/ book value of total assets. FundHLD is the percentage of shares owned by mutual funds. SSHLD is the percentage of shares owned by social security funds. QFIIHLD is the percentage of shares owned by QFIIs. StateHLD is the percentage of shares owned by state government and if state government is the controlling shareholder in the listed firm. HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. EXRET is prior 12-month market-adjusted stock return of a firm and the excess returns are calculated by deducting aggregated-market return from the firm's realized returns. HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. EXRET is prior 12-month market-adjusted stock return of a firm and the excess returns are calculated by deducting aggregated-market return from the firm's realized returns. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. EXRET is prior 12-month market-adjusted stock return of a firm and the excess returns are calculated by deducting aggregated-market return from the firm's realized returns. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. EXRET is prior 12-month market-adjusted stock return of a firm and the excess returns are calculated by deducting aggregated-market return from the firm's realized returns. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated with *, **, and ***, respectively. HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. EXRET is prior 12-month market-adjusted stock return of a firm and the excess returns are calculated by deducting aggregated-market return from the firm's realized returns. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated with *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) accounting multiples and are intended to capture the extent to which a firm is misvalued relative to its contemporaneous industry peers. IDIO is idiosyncratic volatility, the standard deviation of stock return residuals estimated from CAPM regressions for each firm-year daily stock returns. FundHLD is the percentage of shares owned by mutual funds. SSHLD is the percentage of shares owned by social security funds. QFIIHLD is the percentage of shares owned by QFIIs. StateHLD is the percentage of shares owned by state government and if state government is the controlling shareholder in the listed firm. HFINDEX is the ownership concentration measure, the sum of squares of the shareholding percentage of the top five largest shareholders. TANG is the tangibility ratio, defined as tangible assets/ the book value of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total debts to book value of total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. EXRET is prior 12-month market-adjusted stock return of a firm and the excess returns are calculated by deducting aggregated-market return from the firm's realized returns. The estimations correct the error structure for heteroskedasticity and clustering using the White-Huber estimator. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are designated with *, **, and ***, respectively.
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